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THE DEATH OF PALSGRAF: A COMMENT ON
THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE DUTY
CONCEPT IN CALIFORNIA
The California courts are in the forefront of the development of
modern tort law into a pro-plaintiff, pro-recovery system. This
Comment analyzes the evolution of the duty concept in California
tort law. Duty has become a plaintiff-oriented doctrine. Duty has
reduced the importance of proximate cause in the negligence
analysis. Pro-defendant aspects of duty have atrophied, replaced
by an analysis based primarily on foreseeability. Duty, tradi-
tionally decided by the trial judge as a threshold question of law,
has in many recent cases been decided, in effect, by the jury as a
question offact.
[We] have not followed the historic limitations of duty ... The concept
has at once been obliterated and obfuscated. Duty, as such, has lost most
of its meaning. 1
Justice Matthew 0. Tobriner
INTRODUCTION
The duty question inquires whether the defendant's obligation
to use due care to avoid injuring others extends to the plaintiff.2
The duty issue in tort law has two conflicting functions. First,
duty helps the plaintiff's chances of recovery by providing a sim-
plified alternative to a proximate cause analysis. However, a sec-
ond function, which tends to bar recovery, is duty's position as a
threshold, judge-determined question of law.
This Comment discusses the historical evolution of the duty
rule in California with particular emphasis on recent decisions of
the California Supreme Court and their implementation by the
lower courts. During the first half of this century, tort cases were
1. Tobriner, The Changing Concept of Duty in the Law of Torts, 9 CAT TRAL
LAW. J. 17, 21-22 (1970).
2. Green, The Submission of Issues in Negligence Cases, 18 U. MAI L REV.
30, 36 (1963), reprinted in L. GREEN, THE LTIGATION PROCESS OF TORT LAw 397 (2d
ed. 1977).
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decided by an extensive proximate cause analysis. Duty, as a
part of this analysis, was determined either as a threshold issue
before the case went to the jury or simply as one minor factor
considered at a later stage.3 California shifted from the latter ap-
proach to the threshold analysis of duty around mid-century.4
The emphasis on proximate cause in determining liability subse-
quently declined as courts paid more attention to the duty ques-
tion. The pro-defendant aspects of duty such as visitor status5
and zone-of-danger 6 rules, as well as foreseeable class of plaintiff
concepts,7 have atrophied in the last three decades. Foreseeabil-
ity that harm might result has become the primary factor in as-
sessing whether a duty exists.
In 1975, in Weirum v. RKO General, Inc.,8 duty was decided, in
effect, by the jury on the basis of foreseeability. Since Weirum,
duty is no longer a judge-determined potential barrier to recovery
in a substantial number of cases. Appellate courts have increas-
ingly reversed dismissals and upheld plaintiffs' verdicts on the
duty issue if any evidence supporting foreseeability of harm was
introduced.9 This change is significant because the trial judge's
discretion to defer the duty question to the jury in novel causes of
action has been increased. The judge's discretion to dismiss the
suit has been sharply limited to areas protected by public policy
considerations.
CALuFoRNiA ADOPTS THE DUTY RULE: MOSLEY TO DILLON
The concept of duty in tort law has changed throughout history.
When tort law was first separated from criminal law, a duty ex-
isted to act with care toward all others. Tort law was, in effect, a
law of strict liability.10 In the nineteenth century duty evolved
into a legalism to protect industrial enterprises from suit by those
injured in their factories or by their machines and products."1 In
the first half of the twentieth century, this pro-defendant bias be-
gan to erode with respect to the duty issue and in most other ar-
3. These are, respectively, the Cardozo and the Andrews positions in Palsgraf
v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
4. Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal. 2d 213, 157 P.2d 372 (1945).
5. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1968).
6. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
7. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
8. 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
9. See notes 54-67 and accompanying text infra.
10. Tobriner, The Changing Concept of Duty in the Law of Torts, 9 CAL. TRIAL
LAW. J. 17, 18 (1970).
11. See generally Note, The Origin of the Modern Standard of Due Care in Neg-
ligence, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 447.
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eas of tort law. In the early twentieth century, tort cases were
determined by an extensive proximate cause analysis. Duty was
included either as a threshold, judge-determined question or as a
minor factor in the entire proximate cause equation. The champi-
ons of these two approaches were Justices Cardozo and Andrews,
respectively, in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.12
California shifted from the Andrews to the Cardozo view as a
result of Mosley v. Arden Farms Co. in 1945.13 In Mosley the
plaintiff was injured when his mowing machine collided with milk
crates hidden by weeds between a sidewalk and a property line.
The defendant milk company had piled the crates on a parking
strip near the sidewalk and had left them unguarded and unat-
tended for over a month. The crates, as the milk company might
have foreseen, were scattered by a third party. The issue was not
a Palsgraf foreseeable plaintiff question but was whether an in-
tervening third party relieved the defendant of liability. The ma-
jority held the defendant liable using a proximate cause analysis.
Justice Traynor concurred, arguing for the adoption of the
Cardozo Palsgraf position so that "in time the courts will dispel
the mists that have settled on the doctrine of proximate cause in
the field of negligence."' 4 Justice Traynor also stated "that de-
fendant's liability depends entirely upon whether it violated a
duty of protecting the plaintiff from unreasonable risk of
harm.. . ."15 Justice Traynor's goal was to simplify and ease the
plaintiff's burden by eschewing the Byzantine maze of the proxi-
mate cause analysis in favor of a more streamlined system of
showing duty, breach, causal connection, and damages. The effect
of this shift was to increase the importance of the duty issue and
to decrease the role of the proximate cause analysis.6
12. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
13. 26 Cal. 2d 213, 157 P.2d 372 (1945).
14. Id. at 222, 157 P.2d at 377 (1945) (Traynor, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 220, 157 P.2d at 376 (Traynor, J., concurring). William Prosser's ap-
proval of Justice Traynor's concurrence may have influenced its subsequent ac-
ceptance. Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CALIF. I REV. 369, 413 n.213
(1950).
16. The important practical effect of the Palsgraf theory is that liability for
unforeseeable consequences is avoided by limiting the scope of the duty,
rather than by the application of restrictive rules of proximate cause.
Hence the admonition of writers to "look for the duty before you talk cau-
sation" and "there is no duty to an unforeseeable plaintiff."
4 B. Wm a, SutamnAY op CALIORNImA LAW Torts § 489, at 2750-51 (8th ed. Supp.
1978).
Mosley had the effect of adopting the Palsgraf duty concept. At
the time, however, this doctrine was pro-defendant in two impor-
tant respects. First, duty was limited by now obsolete rules such
as visitor status, zone of danger, and foreseeable class of plain-
tiffs. Second, duty was a threshold, judge-determined question
that could prevent a victim's case from going to trial. The next
thirty years of California tort law is a history of the elimination of
these pro-defendant aspects of duty. Justice Traynor's expecta-
tion that proximate cause would become less complex and impor-
tant has been concurrently realized.'
7
Although some courts have continued to use duty as a bar to re-
covery,18 the dominant theme has been the metamorphosis of
duty into a pro-plaintiff doctrine. This new concept of duty fol-
lows Justice Cardozo's view because it continues to be a thresh-
old question; it resembles Justice Andrews' version by imposing a
nearly universal duty of care.19
Another important shift in emphasis in the duty analysis is re-
flected in the transition toward duty defined by foreseeability of
harm rather than by the relationship between the parties. 20 In
17. Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist., 22 Cal. 3d 508, 585 P.2d 851,
150 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1978), supports the proposition that proximate cause has declined
in importance and complexity.
Although defendant argues that its [negligence was not] a proximate
cause of the accident because [it] . . .bore no duty ... [o]ur opinion [in
Daley v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741, 470 P.2d 360, 87
Cal. Rptr. 376 (1970) ] made clear that the [defendant] could be held liable
so long as its negligent supervision was an actual ("but for") cause of the
injury and the general type of injury was reasonably foreseeable.
Id. at 520-21 n.6, 585 P.2d at 858 n.6, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 8 n.6.
18. The following cases illustrate a defendant-oriented approach to duty. In
Richards v. Stanley, 43 CaL. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954), the defendant left her keys in
the ignition of her auto in violation of a city ordinance. Someone stole the car and
negligently struck the plaintiff. Held, the statute did not create a duty because its
intention was solely to prevent theft, not to protect a class of persons who might
be injured by negligent driving. O'Keefe v. South End Rowing Club, 64 Cal. 2d 729,
414 P.2d 830, 51 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1966), held that a landowner owes no duty to chil-
dren injured while swimming and playing on the landowner's pier if they were
neither invited nor given explicit permission to be there. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel
& Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963), refused to extend
liability in a situation in which a mother suffered emotional distress when a negli-
gent motorist struck her child. The rationale was that the plaintiff was not within
that class toward which the defendant was negligent; thus, the injury did not give
rise to liability.
See also Brousseau v. Jarrett, 73 Cal. App. 3d 864, 878, 141 Cal. Rptr. 200, 208
(1977) (dissenting opinion) ("[T]here is no duty on the part of a physician to his
patient to write a nonnegligent medical report.").
19. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 350, 162 N.E. 99, 103 (1928) (An-
drews, J., dissenting).
20. The courts have continued to pay tribute to the Cardozo Palsgraf opinion,
not for its "class of plaintiffs" view but rather for the concept that "the risk reason-
ably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed." Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728,
739, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79 (1968); Valdez v. J.D. Diffenbaugh Co., 51
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Richardson v. Ham,21 the court found a duty owed by a defendant
construction company for damages caused by a stolen bulldozer
that passers-by had found unlocked and had taken for a joyride.
The court observed that the foreseeability of harm from the joy-
ride created a duty on the part of the owner to prevent the injury.
In the years following the Richardson decision, foreseeability of
harm resulted in a finding of liability against the following de-
fendants: an attorney whose poor draftsmanship of a will harmed
the intended beneficiaries; 22 a bank, for damages to a depositor as
a result of an erroneously dishonored checka a contractor whose
truck was stolen when the keys were left in the ignition, for harm
to a plaintiff struck by the truck, 24 and a bowling alley whose
management did not protect a patron from a known assailant
waiting outside.25
These cases demonstrate the evolution from a defendant-ori-
ented duty rule toward the early law of strict liability. At the time
of Mosley, many urged a duty analysis as an attractive alternative
to the elaborate proximate cause approach with its myriad pitfalls
for the plaintiff. The effect of adopting the duty analysis was to
increase recovery by allowing the case to go to the jury if the in-
jury was reasonably foreseeable. California did not adopt the
parts of the Palsgraf theory insulating defendants from suit. On
the contrary, the cases above demonstrate a duty concept that is
not to be used to protect a defendant from a meritorious suit.
This use of the duty concept is consistent with the California
Supreme Court's subsequent sweeping reevaluation of tort law as
a pro-plaintiff, pro-recovery system of compensation for injured
victims.
Cal. App. 3d 494, 505, 124 Cal. Rptr. 467, 474 (1975) (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island
R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928)). Duty is defined by foreseeability of
harm viewed from the plaintiff's perspective as the reasonable expectation of an
innocent party not to be harmed by the acts of others. B. CORNBLUM, MODERN
CALIFORNIA PERSONAL INJURY LrIGATION § 8 (Supp. 1976).
21. 44 Cal. 2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955).
22. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961) (de-
fendant, however, held not negligent as a matter of law).
23. Weaver v. Bank of America, 59 Cal. 2d 428, 380 P.2d 644, 30 Cal. Rptr. 4
(1963).
24. Hergenrether v. East, 61 Cal. 2d 440, 393 P.2d 164, 39 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1964).
25. Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc., 65 Cal. 2d 114, 416 P.2d 793, 52 Cal. Rptr. 561
(1966).
DILLON AND THE DISINTEGRATION OF DUTY AS A DEFENSE
In 1968 the California Supreme Court handed down two
landmark duty cases, Dillon v. Legg26 and Rowland v. Christian.
27
Dillon eliminated the artificial zone-of-danger requirement from
suits for negligent infliction of emotional distress.28 Rowland
eliminated the equally artificial visitor status barriers to recovery
in negligence cases against landowners.29 Traditional duty rules
were rejected as "legal device[s] ... designed to curtail the
feared propensities of juries toward liberal awards."30
In Dillon the court recognized a cause of action for a mother,
not in the zone of danger, who suffered emotional distress when
she witnessed a negligently driven vehicle strike and kill her
child. Attacking the defendant's contention that it owed no duty
to the mother, the court in Dillon stated flatly that the duty analy-
sis begs the question, that the duty concept has questionable his-
torical justification, and that it should not be used as a means of
limiting liability simply because defining the limits of recovery is
difficult.3 ' The court emphasized that foreseeability of risk is the
primary factor in establishing the element of duty.32
Rowland followed a similar reasoning in ruling that plaintiffs
status as a "licensee" on the property artificially immunizes the
defendant from suit. Rowland held that the foundation of Califor-
nia negligence law is California Civil Code section 1714, which
provides: "Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his
willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his
want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property
or person . . . ."33 Therefore, the court believed, no departure
should be made from this general duty of care rule unless clearly
supported by public policy. Rowland considered foreseeability of
harm to the plaintiff to be the most important factor in assessing
26. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
27. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
28. Parents suffering emotional distress from witnessing injury to their chil-
dren could recover damages only if they were close enough to the accident to have
some fear for their own safety. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d
295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 333-34 (4th
ed. 1971).
29. The extent of the duty the landowner or occupier owed to a plaintiff in-
jured on his property was dependent on whether the plaintiff was classified as an
invitee, licensee, trespassing child, or trespassing adult. See W. PROSSER, THE LAw
OF TORTS 351-99 (4th ed. 1971).
30. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 734, 441 P.2d 912, 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76
(1968).
31. Id. at 728, 441 P.2d at 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
32. Id. at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
33. CA. CIV. CODE § 1714 (Deering 1979), construed in Rowland v. Christian,
69 Cal. 2d 108, 111-12, 443 P.2d 561, 563-64, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99-100 (1968).
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whether to depart from the general duty of care rule.3 4 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court from 1968 to 1974 further defined duty by
foreseeability.35 The pro-plaintiff trend in these cases reflects
evolving societal attitudes favoring greater protection for the con-
sumer, the individual, and the innocent victim.36
34. A departure from this fundamental principle involves the balancing of
numerous considerations; the major ones are the foreseeability of harm to
the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the
closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the in-
jury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the
policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden on the defend-
ant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise
care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prev-
alence of insurance for the risk involved.
Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112-13, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100
(1968).
35. In Conner v. Great W. Sav.& Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609,73 Cal.
Rptr. 369 (1968), the commercial lender that did not investigate a developer to
which it lent funds was held to owe a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent
the construction and sale of seriously defective houses. In Barrera v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 456 P.2d 674, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1969), the defend-
ant insurance company attempted to rescind a policy in force for one and one half
years because of the belated discovery, after an auto accident, that the co-defend-
ant-insured driver had falsified information in his original application. The court
held that an insurance company must promptly investigate or lose any right of re-
scission. The insurance company owed a duty to the motoring public to investi-
gate promptly to protect the public from the spectre of loss resulting from cases
involving retroactively uninsured drivers. In Elmore v. American Motors Co., 70
Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969), a strict products liability case, the
court found the manufacturer liable for injuries to an innocent bystander. The
court, in effect, eliminated any duty (or privity) requirement from products liabil-
ity and held that an obligation of safety runs to anyone injured because of a prod-
uct's defective performance. Id. at 586, 451 P.2d at 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 656-57.
Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971), held a tavern
keeper liable for the injuries from a vehicle accident involving an intoxicated per-
son to whom he had sold alcoholic beverages. The court specifically rejected the
argument for nonliability based on proximate cause and instead found a duty
owed by the tavern keeper to the public at large. The court relied on a duty aris-
ing from a violation of CA. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (Deering 1979), which
makes the furnishing of an alcoholic beverage to an intoxicated person a misde-
meanor. The court did not decide whether a common law duty existed. Vesely v.
Sager, 5 Cal. 3d at 165, 486 P.2d at 159, 95 Cal Rptr. at 631. Vesely was abrogated by
the legislature in 1978. CA.. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (Deering 1979). See Com-
ment, Liquor, the Law, and California: One Step Forward-Two Steps Backward,
16 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 355 (1979). Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d
382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974), allowed yet another previously barred
cause of action: recovery for a wife's loss of consortium with her husband. In a
revealing passage, Justice Mosk quoted from Justice Tobriner's majority Dillon
opinion: "That the courts shouldallow recovery ... would appear to be a compel-
ling proposition." Id. at 386, 525 P.2d at 671, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 767 (quoting Dillon v.
Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 730, 441 P.2d 912, 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 74 (1968)).
36. See generally Rintala, "Status" Concepts in the Law of Torts, 58 CALiF. L
Justice Tobriner commented that the concept of duty has be-
come simply "a shorthand statement that one party must recom-
pense another for the loss."3 7 Duty was used to place the risk on
the party whose status, power, and financial responsibility placed
it in the best position to compensate the victim or to avoid the
risk. Specifically, Dillon and its progeny turned duty from a de-
fendants' shield to a plaintiffs' sword in finding liability against in-
sured motorists, insurance carriers, financial institutions, and
landlords. "[T]hese cases.. ." wrote Justice Tobriner, "have not
followed the historic limitations of duty.... The concept has at
once been obliterated and obfuscated. Duty, as such, has lost
most of its meaning."38
An appellate court case amply summarizes these decisions:
"Dillon postulated reasonable foreseeability as the primary,
court-determined test of liability.... [Dillon and Rowland] rele-
gated the duty test to a secondary role" as a safeguard against re-
mote and unexpected liabilities.39 The trend, clearly, was to use
duty to the plaintiffs' advantage rather than as a barrier to recov-
ery.40 The class of plaintiffs to which Mrs. Palsgraf belonged had
become foreseeable in California 41 By 1974 duty was a pro-plain-
REv. 80 (1970); Tobriner, Retrospect: Ten Years on the California Supreme Court,
20 U.C.J.A. L. REv. 5 (1972).
37. Tobriner, The Changing Concept of Duty in the Law of Torts, 9 CAL. TRIAL
LAw. J. 17, 21 (1970).
38. Id. at 21-22.
39. Adams v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 37, 41-42, 123 Cal. Rptr.
216, 219 (1975), hearing denied, id. at 48 (court ruled in favor of defendant on au-
thority of Fifleld Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 354 P.2d 1073, 7 Cal. Rptr. 377
(1960)) (Justices Tobriner and Mosk were of the opinion that petition for hearing
should be granted).
40. Excellent source materials examining this reversal of perspective in the
duty analysis are Horvitz, Justice Tobriner's Tort Decisions: A Reafjrmation of the
Common Law Process, 29 HASTINGs L.J. 167 (1977); Rintala, "Status" Concepts in
the Law of Torts, 58 CALw. L. REV. 80 (1970); Sulnick, A Political Perspective of
Tort Law, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 410 (1970); Tobriner, Retrospect: Ten Years on the
California Supreme Court, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 5 (1972).
41. Sulnick, A Political Perspective of Tort Law, 7 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 410, 416
n.37 (1970). Any lingering belief in the vitality of the Palsgraf "unforeseeable
plaintiff" class concept has been put to rest by Justice Tobriner
Perhaps the third party, the "unforeseeable" plaintiff, is no more than a
symbol of the general public, and perhaps the courts are saying that they
require no special "duty" upon which to rest recovery for that class but
primarily look to the status of the obligor and to the public's reasonable
expectancy as to the performance of his product or as to the defendant's
conduct. If so, in one sense, the courts have imposed a universal duty of
care that runs to all mankind, and thus indeed have returned to the feu-
dal notion of duty and status that predated the restrictive barriers on lia-
bility that were the hallmarks of the Industrial Revolution.
Tobriner, The Changing Concept of Duty in the Law of Torts, 9 CAL. TRIAL LAW. J.
17, 22 (1970).
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tiff concept defined primarily by foreseeability that harm might
result and subject only to public policy-based exceptions.
WEIRUM GIVEs THE DUTY QUESTION TO THE JURY
In 1975 the California Supreme Court in Weirum v. RKO Gen-
eral, Inc.,42 in effect allowed the jury to decide the question of
duty. This decision indicates that, except when clear public policy
considerations demand insulation of the defendant from liability,
the courts will not apply a restrictive, pro-defendant duty rule in
California 4 3
Duty historically has been a question of law.44 Duty as a restric-
tion on liability developed along with other restrictions on liabil-
ity. As a general rule, if the judge let the case go to the jury, the
plaintiff usually recovered regardless of the merits of the case,45
often for reasons of sympathy, prejudice, and emotion 6
In the pre-Weirum duty analysis, foreseeability was examined
twice. First, the judge decided whether the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty, using a variety of factors of which foreseeability
was paramount.47 Second, the jury used foreseeability to deter-
mine whether the defendant was negligent.48 Recognizing this bi-
42. 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
43. The functions of the judge and the jury are elastic and subject to change.
Any rule that enlarges the jury's sphere extends liability, and any rule that re-
stricts the jury's sphere restricts liability. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 15.1, at 871 (1956).
44. "The issue of duty to the plaintiff is very definitely one of law and can be
nothing else." Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CAUF. L REV. 369, 423
(1950). Accord, B. CORNELUM, MODERN CALIFORNIA PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION §
7, at 6 (Supp. 1976); 3 J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 45.02, at 230 (West 1978); W.
PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 206 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 328B (b) (1965); 4 B. WrrKIN, SummARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw Torts § 493, at 2756
(8th ed. Supp. 1978); Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. LI REV.
1401, 1417-18 (1961), reprinted in L. GREEN, THE LITGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAw
299-300 (2d ed. 1977).
45. For statistical support of the thesis that juries are pro-plaintiff, see 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS § 15.5, at 892 nn.12-14 (1956).
46. "[I]f the jury is given.the power to decide the case, it is impossible actu-
ally to prevent them from deciding it on any basis whatever which appeals to their
own minds, tastes, prejudices, or emotions." Id. at § 15.4, at 884. "Whenever such
issues [as duty] are left to the jury in the great grab-bag of proximate cause, the
court is again abdicating decisions in favor of men who do not know the law."
Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CALIF. I REV. 369, 423 (1950).
47. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 111-13, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70
Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968).
48. Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUm. LI REV. 1401, 1417-18
furcated analysis of foreseeability is necessary to understanding
the Weirum decision.
Weirum is an extraordinary case in which "the Real Don
Steele," a radio disc jockey, conducted a radio contest in which he
encouraged his teenaged listeners to chase him about Los Ange-
les by offering nominal cash prizes and the ephemeral notoriety
of a short radio interview to the first person to catch him as he
traveled about the city. Two young listeners were involved in a
high speed vehicle chase which resulted in the death of an
uninvolved third party. The survivors brought a wrongful death
suit against the two drivers and RKO, the parent corporation of
the Real Don Steele's radio station KHJ. The plaintiffs prevailed
at trial, and the California Supreme Court unanimously affirmed
RKO's liability. Justice Mosk's opinion stated that "duty is prima-
rily a question of law."49 Thus, the emphasis shifted from duty as
an absolute question of law to a question primarily of law. How-
ever, the court further stated that "foreseeability of the risk is a
primary consideration in establishing the element of duty....
While duty is a question of law, foreseeability is a question of fact
for the jury."50
The court then upheld the jury's finding of the existence of a
duty by concluding that ample evidence of foreseeability was sub-
mitted to the trier of fact:
The verdict in plaintiffs' favor here necessarily embraced a finding that de-
cedent was exposed to a foreseeable risk of harm. It is elementary that
our review of this finding is limited to the determination whether there is
any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will sup-
port the conclusion reached by the jury. We conclude that the record am-
ply supports the finding of foreseeability.51
Weirum thus has the practical effect of giving the jury the de-
termination of duty. The judge is thereby severely limited in his
ability to sustain a demurrer or to declare a nonsuit when the de-
fendant raises the duty issue as a defense. The appellate process
is invoked only once-after trial-if the judge defers the duty
question to the jury. A pre-trial dismissal, conversely, potentially
leads to separate appeals on the pre-trial dismissal and the trial
verdict. This situation adds time and cost to the judicial process
and further delays compensation to an injured party.
Certain areas of vitality for a determination by the judge on the
(1961), reprinted in L. GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAw 299-300 (2d ed.
1977).
49. Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal. Rptr.
468, 471 (1975).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 46, 539 P.2d at 39-40, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 471-72.
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duty issue remain. When the other factors that determine duty
5 2
(especially public policy) outweigh the importance of foreseeabil-
ity, the judge may decide the duty question. Furthermore, the
judge may rule positively that a duty exists,5 3 an action that pro-
duces the same result as deferring the duty question to the jury.
The net effect of Weirum, nevertheless, is that in a substantial
number of cases the trial judge may not bar the case from going
to the jury by reason of the defendant's claim that he owes no
duty to the plaintiff.
CASE LAW FOLLOWING WEIRUM
The California Supreme Court has reaffirmed the Weirum view
of duty in subsequent cases, and the appellate courts have re-
sponsively followed this lead. These cases indicate that if the
plaintiff pleads foreseeability and no countervailing policy rea-
sons are present, the case should proceed to trial.
Supreme Court Decisions
In Landeros v. Flood,54 a physician treating an injured child
negligently failed to diagnose "battered child syndrome." The
child was subsequently further abused. The court used, curiously
enough, a proximate cause analysis in affirming the doctor's liabil-
ity. Citing Weirum, the court held that liability turns on foresee-
ability, which is a question of fact for the jury.5-
In Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl, Inc.,5 6 a tavernkeeper was sued for
the wrongful death of a young man by alcohol poisoning. The de-
cedent was served ten shots of 151-proof rum in less than one and
52. See note 44 supra.
53. See, e.g., Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 534 (1978).
54. 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
55. As we recently observed with respect to a determination of duty, how-
ever, "foreseeability is a question of fact for the jury." (Weirum v. RKO
General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46 [123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 361.) The
same rule applies when the issue is whether the intervening act of a third
person was foreseeable and therefore did not constitute a superseding
cause: in such circumstances 'The foreseeability of the risk generally
frames a question for the trier of fact" (Weaver v. Bank of America (1963)
59 Cal. 2d 428, 434 [30 Cal. Rptr. 4, 380 P.2d 644]; accord, Rest. 2d Torts,
§ 453, com. b).
Id. at 411, 551 P.2d at 395, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 75. See also Isaacson, Child Abuse Re-
porting Statutes: A Case for Holding Physicians Civilly Liable for Failing to Re-
port, 12 SAx DIEGO L. REv. 743 (1975).
56. 20 Cal. 3d 389, 572 P.2d 1155, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1978).
one half hours. The California Supreme Court overruled a non-
suit. The issues of duty, foreseeability, contributory negligence,
and willful and wanton misconduct were all held to be questions
for the jury to decide. The court dismissed the issue of a bar-
tender's duty to a patron as a foregone conclusion, observing that
"a person is liable for the reasonably foreseeable injuries caused
by his failure to exercise reasonable care .... The questions of
causality, foreseeability, and reasonableness which derive from
this rule are factual, and thus constitute questions for the jury."57
In both Ewing and Landeros duty is eliminated as a barrier to
presenting the case to the trier of fact. The jury determines the
defendant's liability by measuring his conduct against the fore-
seeability of the risk. When the jury finds foreseeability, this find-
ing is used to answer both the negligence and the duty question.
The traditional bifurcated foreseeability analysis is therefore
eliminated.58
Appellate Court Decisions
The appellate courts promptly applied the Weirum doctrine.
One court succinctly summarized the new approach in reversing
a dismissal on the duty issue by the trial judge: "Foreseeability of
the risk is the primary consideration in establishing a duty of
care.... Thus, the question is whether appellant's evidence...
established facts from which the jury could have inferred a duty
.... "59 Weirum has led the appellate courts to limit severely the
trial judge's authority to rule in the defendant's favor on a demur-
rer, a nonsuit, a motion for summary judgment, or a directed ver-
dict based on the duty question. Conversely, the appellate courts
have not questioned on duty grounds trial judges' decisions to en-
tertain novel causes of action.
The question of duty has been held to be within the province of
the jury in cases in which the state failed to provide a safe place
to work to a contractor's employee,60 a landlord failed to warn a
57. Id. at 399, 572 P.2d at 1159, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 17-18.
58. For a discussion of the bifurcated foreseeability analysis, see text accom-
panying notes 42-48 supra.
59. Holman v. State, 53 Cal. App. 3d 317, 332, 124 Cal. Rptr. 773, 782 (1975). In
Holman a heavy-equipment operator fell into the unguarded driveshaft of an
earth-moving machine and was injured. He sued the state on two counts: negli-
gence in selecting an incompetent contractor (the plaintiffs employer) and failure
in its duty as a statutory employer to provide a safe place to work, as required by
CAi. LAB. CODE §§ 6401-6408 (Deering 1979). The trial judge sustained a demurrer
to the first count and at the close of the plaintiff's case-in-chief granted a nonsuit
in favor of the state as to the second count. The appellate court reversed, citing
Weirum and Dillon.
60. Holman v. State, 53 Cal. App. 3d 317, 124 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1975).
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new tenant about a rapist,6 1 a traffic officer did not take affirma-
tive action to protect a disabled vehicle from an ensuing colli-
sion,62 a doctor issued an incorrect medical report to an insurance
company to the detriment of the insured,63 a poorly lighted air-
port parking area became the scene of a mugging,64 police officers
negligently created a situation in which a fleeing suspect injured
a third party,65 the state failed to correct a design defect in a
bridge and an accident occurred,66 and self-dealing general part-
ners made a capital call on limited partners for the purpose of
61. O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487
(1977). The appellate court reversed the trial court with instructions to overrule
the demurrer. The plaintiff had been raped in her apartment. She alleged that the
defendant landlord concealed informktion about a man who had raped several fe-
male tenants, deceitfully misrepresented the safety and security of the apartment
building, and failed to provide security. The appellate court brushed aside the
landlord's duty defense that the rape had not taken place in the common area,
stating: "An analysis of the factors set forth in Rowland [used to decide duty]
shows that there is potential liability here. The existence of the most important
factor, foreseeability, was alleged." Id. at 804, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 490. The allegation
of foreseeability of harm in the complaint was thus sufficient to vitiate the trial
judge's discretion to dismiss the case.
62. Mann v. State, 70 Cal. App. 3d 773, 139 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1977). A directed ver-
dict for the defendant was reversed. A California highway patrolman had stopped
for two disabled vehicles on the freeway and left when a tow truck arrived before
the tow truck assumed the screening position that the CHP vehicle had been in.
An elderly, partially blind driver then ran into the stalled vehicles, injuring the
plaintiffs. Ruling immunity inapplicable, the appellate court also held that the in-
dependent intervening negligent conduct of a third party was reasonably foresee-
able by the traffic officer.
63. Brousseau v. Jarrett, 73 Cal. App. 3d 864, 141 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1977). The phy-
sician, employed by the insurance company, wrote an unduly conservative report
as to the extent of the plaintiff's residual disability. The plaintiff detrimentally re-
lied on the report when settling his claim. The trial court sustained the defendant
physician's demurrer, and the appellate court reversed.
64. Slapin v. Los Angeles Int'l Airport, 65 Cal. App. 3d 484, 135 Cal. Rptr. 296
(1976). Held, the plaintiffs, victims of the mugging, were entitled to attempt to
prove that the poor lighting created a reasonable risk of the kind of injury that
they sustained.
65. Sparks v. City of Compton, 64 Cal. App. 3d 592, 134 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1976).
Undercover policemen brandished firearms and initiated a high speed vehicle
chase. The fleeing suspects were unaware that their pursuers were police officers.
The suspects struck and injured the plaintiff, another motorist. Reversing a sum-
mary judgment for the defendant, the City of Compton, the court stated that the
jury decides foreseeability and that foreseeability determines duty. Id. at 597-98,
134 Cal. Rptr. at 687-88.
66. Harland v. State, 75 Cal. App. 3d 475, 142 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1977). The trial
court found for the plaintiffs on two counts of negligence. First, the state failed in
its duty to safely design, construct, and maintain the bridge. The state lost its stat-
utory design immunity when it failed to correct defects reported to it by the Cali-
fornia Highway Patrol. Second, the driver of the vehicle that crashed into a
guardrail and then crossed the unprotected median strip, colliding with plaintiffs'
vehicle, was a resident of a California Veteran's Home and regularly took prescrip-
squeezing them out.67 These cases either affirmed plaintiffs' ver-
dicts or reversed sustained demurrers, nonsuits, directed verdicts,
or summary judgments that were in favor of the defendants.
These cases reiterated the Weirum principle that the jury decides
foreseeability, and foreseeability of harm creates a duty of care
subject to negation only by judicially discerned policy factors.
CASE LAW AFFIRMING THE PUBLIC POLICY LIMITATIONS OF WEIRUM
The doctrinal implications of Weirum are that in most cases the
duty rule no longer stands as an initial barrier to the plaintiff.
Weirum, however, leaves open some areas of continued vitality
for a judicial assessment of the duty question.
68
To rule on the duty issue when public policy considerations are
of paramount importance remains within the province of the trial
judges and the appellate courts. Justice Traynor's observation in
1945 is still good law today: "[The issue of] liability as a matter of
public policy ... is for the court."69 Rowland echoes this theme,
holding that liability must flow from the fundamental principle
stated in California Civil Code section 1714 except when a depar-
ture from this principle is "clearly supported by public policy."70
Supreme Court Decisions
Since Weirum, the California Supreme Court, in reviewing
plaintiffs' appeals from dismissal on the duty question, has fre-
quently affirmatively instructed trial judges that a duty exists.
7 '
tion drugs. The trial court relied on the "special relationship" doctrine of Tarasoff
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976),
to find that the Veteran's Home owed the plaintiffs a duty of care to control their
charges. The appellate rourt affirmed the first count, with a concurring justice
stating that he would affirm both counts.
67. Baldwin v. Marina City Properties, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 3d 393, 145 Cal. Rptr,
406 (1978). The plaintiffs, vendors of a limited partnership interest, brought suit
against their vendee, the general partner, and the limited partnership for transac-
tions including unanswered capital calls that resulted in losses to and impairment
of plaintiffs security under the contract of sale. Although it questioned the
strength of plaintiff's allegations, the appellate court ruled that for the trial court
to sustain defendant's demurrers without leave to amend was an abuse of discre-
tion "under the principle of both willful and negligent liability as set forth in sec-
tion 1714 of the Civil Code and under the concept that reasonable foreseeability of
harm can create a duty of care.. . ." Id. at 414, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
68. "The determination of duty is primarily a question of law... [and] must
be decided on a case-by-case basis." Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46,
539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 471 (1975).
69. Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal. 2d 213, 223, 157 P.2d 372, 377 (1945) (con-
curring opinion).
70. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97,
100 (1968), cited in Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d
814, 823, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 859 (1976).
71. See, e.g., Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach School Dist., 22 Cal. 3d 508, 585 P.2d
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The court has defined limits, however, by declaring that no duty
exists in situations in which financial considerations rather than
substantive merits predominate. Policy considerations such as
protecting certain relationships and institutions and reducing ex-
cessive awards have led the court to reject the plaintiffs' duty ar-
guments in cases involving the attorney-client relationship,7 2 an
assigned-risk auto insurance plan,73 alternative compensation
schemes,74 and nonpecuniary loss. 75 The limits of the expansive
851, 150 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1978); Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669,
145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978); Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551
P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). In all these cases the plaintiff appealed a dismis-
sal on the duty question. Had the trial judges allowed the cases to go to the jury,
the results would have been procedurally similar to Weirum. Assuming the plain-
tiff would have prevailed, the defendant would have appealed and lost, and the
matter would have been finished. Instead, the cases had to be sent back for trial.
Weirum indicates that the procedural aspects of tort law should adopt the pro-
plaintiff bias that the substantive law has already incorporated. Perhaps the les-
son to trial judges is that, absent strong public policy reasons to the contrary, a
tort case should not be dismissed on the duty issue. Coulter was abrogated by the
legislature in 1978. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (Deering 1978). See Comment,
Liquor, the Law, and California: One Step Forward-Two Steps Backward, 16
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 355 (1979).
72. In Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375
(1976), an attorney gave poor advice to his client. Another party relied on this ad-
vice to its detriment. The supreme court held that the attorney owed no duty of
care to the other party in an arm's-length transaction. The public policy rationale
is not clear in this case. Justice Mosk, joined by Justice Tobriner, dissented: "The
refusal to impose a duty on the attorney in these circumstances unfairly penalizes
innocent persons whose injury was the foreseeable result of the attorney's negli-
gence .... [A] n attorney who negligently advises his client to enter into a trans-
action which will inevitably harm another may be liable to the person injured."
Id. at 354, 556 P.2d at 749, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 387. Accord, Parnell v. Smart, 66 Cal.
App. 3d 833, 136 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1977).
73. Nipper v. California Auto. Assigned Risk Plan, 19 Cal. 3d 35, 560 P.2d 743,
136 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1977). The fear of ruin of the California Automobile Assigned
Risk Plan led the supreme court to hold that no duty exists when the defendant
insurance companies fail to screen from coverage potentially dangerous drivers.
See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 627, 142 Cal. Rptr.
249 (1977). But of. Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 456
P.2d 674, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1969) (no public policy considerations barred a finding
of duty). See note 35 supra.
74. In Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 571 P.2d 609, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1977), a
policeman sued the parents of a teenager who hosted a party at their home. Disor-
der developed and the policeman was sent to the residence. The policeman at-
tempted to arrest some individuals for being drunk in public but was attacked and
injured. The trial judge sustained a demurrer to the parents' duty, and the
supreme court affirmed, invoking the "fireman's rule" that no cause of action ex-
ists against a defendant whose negligence occasions an officer's exposure to dan-
ger. The court held the fireman's rule is premised on sound public policy and
cited the availability to the policeman of medical and disability benefits, workers'
compensation, and special disability pensions.
75. In Borer v. American Airlines, 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302
modern duty rule appear to be those relatively few cases in which
public policy considerations clearly outweigh the judicial prefer-
ence for compensation of the victim. These cases do not signifi-
cantly depart from Weirum's pro-plaintiff analysis.
Appellate Court Decisions
Further definition of the boundaries of duty has come from the
intermediate appellate courts. The courts have affirmed dismis-
sals in favor of a defendant school district sued for negligent fail-
ure to provide an adequate education and for negligent
misrepresentation that the plaintiff, a pupil, was performing ade-
quately76 and a defendant public housing corporation sued by a
third party injured in a gunfight in the apartment laundry room.7
In the latter case, all the people involved were strangers to the
apartment building. Both cases cited fairness to the defendants
as the basis for dismissing otherwise meritorious suits.
The public policy rationale was implicit but unstated in dismis-
sals on duty grounds in the following situations: a tow-truck oper-
ator, injured on a highway while preparing to tow a vehicle, who
sued the municipality because a policeman was present at the
(1977), and Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 563 P.2d 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315
(1977), the supreme court affirmed dismissals in actions for recovery for negli-
gently caused injury resulting in loss of parent-child consortium by either the
child or the parent. Justice Mosk, the sole dissenter in Borer and Baxter, pointed
out that California cases of the last decade dictated that a cause of action be rec-
ognized when harm to the plaintiffs was foreseeable. The reasoning of the major-
ity is not clear. The REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA CITIZEN'S COMMISSION ON TORT
REFORM: RIGHTING THE LiABun-Ty BALANCE 65 (1977) asserts that Borer and Baxter
are temporary abberations unlikely to remain law. Levy & Ursin, California Tort
Law: At the Crossroads?, 67 CAuF. L. REV. 497 (1979), while noting the Com-
mission Report, suggests that these decisions are best understood as damages
cases limiting damage awards when nonpecuniary loss is involved. See also Jus-
tus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977) (no duty owed
in a suit involving nonpecuniary loss).
76. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1976). The court, after recognizing the evolution of duty to the incorpo-
ration of foreseeability test, went on to say that duty is a question of law. The
court stated that considerations of public policy are part of the duty analysis and
in this case were the most important factor. Fearing tort claims in countless num-
bers by disaffected students and parents, the court dismissed the case, reasoning
that the "ultimate consequences, in terms of public time and money, would bur-
den [the schools]-and society-beyond calculation." Id. at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at
861. This case presented a duty-foreseeability question that, under the Weirum
analysis, could have gone to the jury but for the superseding importance of the
public policy issue.
77. Totten v. More Oakland Residential Housing, Inc., 63 Cal. App. 3d 538, 134
Cal. Rptr. 29 (1976).
[voL. 16: 793, 1979] Comments
San Diego Law Review
scene;78 a company, the victim of embezzlement by a probationer,
that sued the county probation department for failure to warn;79
county employees who were assaulted by a probationer whom
they had investigated and who sued the county for negligently al-
lowing the assailant to go free.80
A reasonable counterweight to California's liberal, pro-plaintiff
duty analysis is reservation of the court's discretion to assess the
public policy considerations. Duty should not be used as a de-
fense to obscure the more important considerations of recovery
for an injured plaintiff: insurance, foreseeability of the harm, and
the ability of the defendant to distribute the risk. In a suit that
might have detrimental effects on the general public, however,
considerations of public policy should reasonably be assessed
and, if of sufficient importance, should prevail.
CONCLUSION
The duty question in California has evolved into a pro-plaintiff
doctrine determined primarily by foreseeability of harm. Duty as
an obstacle to the plaintiffs recovery is highly suspect unless
clear considerations of public policy militate against finding the
defendant liable. The jury rather than the judge can now answer
the duty question in a significant number of cases.
In 1945 Justice Traynor's concurrence in the Mosley decision
adopted the Cardozo Palsgraf duty analysis as a simpler, more
plaintiff-oriented alternative to proximate cause. As a pro-plaintiff
doctrine, two drawbacks to the duty approach existed. One was
the necessity of demonstrating some relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant giving rise to a duty. The second was
that duty, as a threshold, judge-determined question, represented
a barrier to bringing the case before the jury. In the last decade
these two barriers have been destroyed.
Weirum put to rest the last sacred cow of the duty paradigm by
allowing the jury in many cases to determine the duty question.
78. Mildalian v. Los Angeles, 79 Cal. App. 3d 150, 144 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1978). But
of. Mann v. California, 70 Cal. App. 3d 773, 139 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1977) (state liable for
traffic officer investigating and then leaving motorists in a dangerous situation).
79. J.A. Meyers & Co. v. Los Angeles County Probation Dep't, 78 Cal. App. 3d
309, 144 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1978). But cf. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352,
73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968) (Youth Authority liable to injured foster parents for plac-
ing violent youth without warning of youth's homicidal tendencies).
80. Whitcombe v. County of Yolo, 73 Cal. App. 3d 698, 141 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1977).
Previously, foreseeability was examined twice during a tort suit,
first by the judge in evaluating duty, then by the jury in deciding
the question of negligence. Now, in many cases the jury alone de-
cides foreseeability and then applies it to both the negligence and
the duty questions.
The net result is that, with respect to duty, the appellate courts
have not overturned a jury finding for the plaintiff if he intro-
duced evidence of foreseeability at trial. The appellate courts
have instead overruled sustained demurrers, nonsuits, directed
verdicts, and summary judgments for the defendant if the com-
plaint or other evidence raised an issue of foreseeability of harm.
The California Supreme Court has consistently held, neverthe-
less, that a departure from a plaintiff-oriented duty rule is permis-
sible if clearly supported by public policy. This amorphous
concept of public policy allows the judiciary the flexibility to in-
corporate present-day concepts of economic reality and common
sense to deny recovery. Since Weirum, courts have invoked pub-
lic policy to deny damages for nonpecuniary loss and to protect
institutions deemed more important than the plaintiffs' claims
against them.
Duty is therefore an assumed constant in the negligence equa-
tion, with a secondary, rejective role invoked only in the interests
of public policy. Duty has thus become a plaintiff-oriented con-
cept in an increasingly plaintiff-oriented tort system. The poten-
tial ramifications of this trend are that a universal duty of care
will be incorporated into tort law, including an affirmative duty to
act to prevent foreseeable harm. Other factors, such as availabil-
ity of insurance and policies of risk distribution and accident re-
duction, have replaced the duty analysis in determining which
victims should recover and when. Judicial discretion has been re-
stricted in directions that would deny recovery and broadened in
directions that encourage recovery. Thus, absent public policy
considerations to the contrary, duty no longer presents a bar to a
jury trial on a novel cause of action if the harm was reasonably
foreseeable.
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